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Sanctions And Deviance:
Another Look

HERBERT M. KRITZER

In the past several years, there has been an extended dialogue in the literature
concerning the question of the efficacy of sanctions as a means of deterring criminal
behavior. There is some convincing evidence that threatened sanctions can and
do deter some forms of behavior, such as parking violations and income tax evasion.'
Do these findings extend to other forms of behavior which our society has defined
as criminal? This issue is considered by Gibbs2 in an article which appeared to find
a clear link between the certainty and severity of sanctions and the murder rate.
Gibbs' article stimulated additional research and analysis, some of which was
intended to refute his findings. Most of these additional analyses ended up confirming
his findings, at least so far as the crime of homicide was concerned. 3
However, this resolution of the issue is unsatisfactory as there have been a
number of challenges to the conceptualization and methods used in these analyses.
There are two thrusts to these critiques. First, in order to accurately examine the
deterrent effect of sanctions, isolated from confounding factors, it is necessary to look
at simultaneous changes in sanctions and crime rates-that is, whether an increase
in the severity of sanctions over time is associated with a decrease of criminal
behavior over time. Chiricos and Waldo performed this analysis and reached such
inconsistent results that they concluded their findings could not be attributed to
deterrence.' As pointed out by Logan,' their analysis is far from perfect-leaving the
validity of the substance of their critique unresolved.
The second major challenge to the cross-sectional studies initiated by Gibbs
is his failure to make explicit the distinction between specific deterrence (that directed
at the individual actually receiving the penalty) and general deterrence (that
directed to other potential lawbreakers). Overall crime rates reflect the activities
both of those offenders who have never been caught and subjected to criminal
sanctions, and those who have served prior prison sentences. (What proportion of
criminal offenses is committed by each group is unknown.) Thus current crime rates
reflect the failure of both specific deterrence and general deterrence; if we are to
understand the mechanisms behind either form of deterrence, it is necessary to
sort out the effects (or lack of effects) of each type.6 However, from a policy
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planning viewpoint, it is useful to know the impact of manipulating the severity of
sanctions regardless of the particular deterrent mechanism involved.
Another distinction which the students of criminal deterrence have generally
failed to make is that between absolute deterrence, which asks the question, "does
this particular sanction deter?" and marginal deterrence, which asks the question,
"would a more severe penalty attached to this criminal prohibition more effectively
deter?"' Since virtually the only way to study absolute deterrence is with an
experimental or quasi-experimental design, and such designs are not possible for
most kinds of criminal behavior, researchers have by necessity focused upon
marginal deterrence.
The cross-sectional studies of marginal deterrence have consistently found a
negative relationship between the murder rate and the certainty and severity of
imprisonment. These analyses have used two different (though similar) sets of data
and a variety of analytic techniques and statistical models, and this set of findings
is in contrast to two other sets. Analyses of the marginal effect of capital punishment
on the murder rate have uniformly shown no consistent and significant differences
between states with death penalties and those without death penalties,8 even after
matching states for similar social and political cultures.' It is also in contrast to
the analysis of the impact of certainty and severity of imprisonment on other
forms of criminal behavior.
Tittle found no simple relationship between length of imprisonment and the
crime rate for six offenses other than homicide (robbery, burglary, larceny, assault,
auto theft, and sex offenses); but certainty of imprisonment was associated with
crime rate for all of the above offenses except auto theft. Tittle suggests that
this might be due to the very low level of certainty of punishment for offenses other
than homicide; the average certainty index of homicide is .471, while for the
other offenses it ranges between .015 and .141. Deterrence theory suggests that
in order for a threatened sanction to effectively deter unwanted behavior, the
certainty that the sanction will be applied must be high and the severity of the
sanction must be high. That is, both certainty and severity of sanctions must be
sufficiently great for deterrence to occur;1 0 even if the penalties for a crime are very
severe, the threatened penalties will have little deterrent effect if the potential
criminal sees a very low probability of actually having to face those penalties.
This argument, when translated into statistical terms, suggests that there should be
an interaction between severity of sanctions and certainty of sanctions. This means
that the combined effect of high severity and high certainty should be greater
than the simple sum of the effects of high severity and high certainty; that is, the
relationship should involve multiplicative as well as additive effects. Multiplicative
interaction terms also can represent models in which neither severity nor certainty
have any impact on crime rate at all until a sufficiently high level of both is achieved.
To test for interactions of this type, Tittle constructed tables showing the
crime rate for each combination of high, medium, and low certainty, and high,
medium and low severity. These tables were meant to test the hypothesis that
"severity acts as a deterrent only when there is a high certainty of punishment.""
After examining tables for each of the seven offenses (including homicide) he
concludes that interaction effects appear to be present for robbery, burglary, larceny,
and assault. There are two problems with this analysis. First, Tittle performs no
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tests of significance upon his tables, and for good reasons; the mean crime rates
presented in each cell of his seven tables are based upon extremely small n's.
There are a total of 62 nonvacant cells in his tables; seventeen of these entries are
averages based upon three or fewer observations, and twenty-six of the cells are
based upon four to six observations. There may indeed be effects of one sort or
another in these tables but to base that conclusion upon such small n's without
statistical tests is highly questionable.
The other problem with Tittle's analysis is more damning: he has
misinterpreted his tables. Tables 1(a) through 1(d) show hypothetical data which
one would expect to find if certain types of relationships were present. These
hypothesized tables show two types of interaction models and two types of additive
(non-interaction) models. The data presented in Tittle's tables most closely
resembles hypothetical Table 1 (d) which is simply an additive table. Also since
Tittle performs no tests for significant partial correlations (i.e., severity controlling
for certainty) we have no way of knowing from his analysis whether or not severity of
imprisonment has a significant impact on crime rates after controlling for certainty;
however, as mentioned above, he did find a simple effect for certainty of punishment.
TABLE 1
HYPOTHETICAL RELATIONSHIPS
(a)
Interactions according to Tittle's hypothesis
(both high severity and high certainty must
be present for deterrence to occur)
SEVERITY
medium
high
CERTAIN TY
.01a
.10
high
.10
.10
mediur mn
.10
.10
low
(b)
Simple Multiplicative Interactions
(the combination of high severity and high
certainty has a greater effect than
the simple sum of the two effects)
SEVERITY
medium
high
CERTAINTY
.06
.01
high
medium
.06
.08
.09
.08
low
(c)
Additive Effects (no interactions)
(Certainty and severity have equal effects)
SEVERITY
TY
high
CERTAIN
medium
.02
high
.04
.04
medium I
.06
.06
low
.08
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low
.10
.10
.10

low
.08
.09
.10

low
.06
.08
.10

(d)
Additive Effects (no interactions)
(Severity has a greater impact than certainty")
CERTAINTY
high
medium
low

SEVERITY
high
.02
.03
.04

medium
.05
.06
.07

low
.08
.09
.10

1Ce1
entries represent hypothesized crime rates.
bSeverity has three times more impact than certainty. The situation could be easily reversed so
that certainty had more impact than severity; the table would simply be transposed.

Using product moment correlations, Logan computed partial correlations of
severity and crime rate controlling for certainty; he utilized the same data
that Tittle's analysis was based upon. Logan found that, while five of the seven
zero-order correlations (one for each of seven offense categories) hetween severity
and crime rate had the wrong sign for deterrence to be operating, after controlling
for certainty all of the signs were in the expected direction, except for the crime
of auto theft. However, only the partial correlations for homicide and assault
(which of the six other offenses is most similar to homicide) are statistically
significant. To test for interactions as hypothesized by Tittle, Logan computed
separate correlations for low and high certainty; the expected pattern of high
correlations in high certainty states and low correlations in low certainty states did
not appear." Thus, except for the crime of homicide (and marginally for assault),
there is no evidence that severity of prison sentences has any direct effect on
crime rates either in a simple additive way or in a more complex multiplicative way.
Nonetheless, there remains evidence that severity of prison sentences does have
some deterrent effect on the incidence of homicide. In this research note, I would
like to turn once again to Gibbs' data in order to show that (1) introduction of
proper control variables renders the relationships between severity and murder rate
spurious, and (2) that previous analyses which have found such relationships
have failed to apply deterrence theory in an adequate manner. This analysis will
utilize both traditional regression techniques and one of the recently developed
techniques for analyzing complex contingency tables."
Analysis and Discussion
The first question that must be answered is whether or not the apparent
relationship between severity of sanctions and murder rate is real or spurious.
Zimring and Hawkins' tested this question using Tittle's data on homicide. The
results of their re-analysis, which involved controlling for region are shown in
Tables 2 (a) and 2 (b). By contrasting individual states with their regional average
homicide rate rather than the national average, Zimring and Hawkins show that
Tittle's simple severity effect for homicide was in fact spurious. Bean and Cushing
applied linear regression analysis to Gibbs' data and introduced two separate controls.
The first of these control variables was a dummy variable for region, South v.
Nonsouth. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 3. Bean and Gushing
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TABLE 2
RE-ANALYSIS OF TITTLE'S DATAS
(a)
Homicide Rates of States of the Union by Higher and Lower than National
Average Homicide Penalties

Higher than national average rate
Lower than national average rate
Total

High-Penalty States

Low-Penalty States

24%
76%

54%
46%

100%

100%

(b)
Homicide Rates of States of the Union by Higher and Lower than Average
Homicide Penalties Compared on a Regional Basis

Higher than regional average rate
Lower than regional average rate
Total
aTaken from Zimring and Hawkins (1973:261)
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Higher than
Regional Average
Penalties

Lower than
Regional Average
Penalties

50%
50%

41%
59%

100%

100%
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then went on to argue that the important underlying variable reflected by region is
the greater tendency of Blacks who are concentrated in the South to commit
homicide." Using this argument as a justification, they replaced the region control
variable with percent Black. The results are also shown in Table 3; the fact
that percent Black accounts for 8% more of the variance than the dummy variable
region seems to justify their argument, at least at first glance. However, what about
the effect of these control variables on the relationship between sanctions and
homicide rate? Racial concentration accounts for 70% of the total variance;
certainty and severity account for an additional 6%; this is 17% of the variance
left unaccounted for by the control variable and constitutes a significant improvement
in the R2 . The conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that while certainty
and severity still account for a significant amount of variation in homicide rate,
the overall importance of these factors is not great.
Can the influence of certainty and severity be reduced still further by
introducing different or additional control variables? Figure 1 shows a possible
FIGURE 1
ALTERNATE EXPLANATIONS OF THE IMPACT OF
SEVERITY AND CERTAINTY ON CRIME RATE

Crime Rate
Culture

Severity
Certainty

explanation of the apparent relationship: local political and social culture is causing
all of the relationships. If this were the case, one would expect region to be a good
dummy variable to explain culture; but this seems to be disputed by the
increased correlation with the racial control variable. Is there a race effect or does
that effect simply reflect the local culture which in turn is confounded with the
concentration of Blacks in the South? This author believes the latter to be the case.
The improved correlation between using percent Black as opposed to region as a
control variable, is simply an accident resulting from the way Bean and Cushing
operationalized their region dummy variable. They included two marginal states in
the Southern group, Maryland and West Virginia; both of these states have relatively
low concentrations of Blacks. If these states are removed from the Southern
groups, there is virtually no difference between the effect of the region control
variable and the race control variable (compare columns 1 and 3 of Table 3);
nonetheless, at least severity is still having a significant effect and the increase in R
when severity and certainty are added to the equation is still significant.
Unless the variable of interest is in fact a nominal variable, any dummy variable
is going to be a crude indicator of the underlying dimension. Ini the case of
regionally variable cultures this is particularly a problem since culture is not a
unidimensional phenomenon. With this in mind, three additional control variables
wvere introduced into the equation (which is shown at the bottom of Table 4).
Each of these variables was seen as reflecting a distinctive aspect of political and
24

social culture. These variables were (1) percent of persons failing the mental portion
of the armed forces preinduction physical (an aggregate measure of educational
attainment), (2) percent of persons residing in a standard metropolitan statistical
area-SMSA (a measure of urbanization), and (3) Jack Walker's" measure of
innovation (an indicator of the level of political development within each state).
This latter variable requires some additional explanation. Innovation measures the
willingness of a state to adopt new administrative procedures and new political,
social, and economic policies. It measures both whether new policies are adopted and
how quickly it is done (i.e., does the state take the lead in new policy directions
or simply follow what other states have done). Thus in one sense, it measures the
level of political development of each state. In states with a high level of political
development, it is expected that violence will be an infrequent means of resolving
conflict, both on the political level and the interpersonal level. Highly developed
states are also expected to view violent behavior in a more negative light than
those states in which violent behavior is more common, and deal with such behavior
more severely. The total set of six predictors accounted for 89% of the variance
in homicide rate;1" and, as can be seen in Table 4, the impact of certainty
TABLE 4
PREDICTING MURDER RATE (y) FROM
SEVERITY AND CERTAINTY WITH FOUR CONTROL VARIABLES
P
t
Beta
Variable
-. 051
-. 078
-. 355
.354
.449
.224

X1 Severity
X2 Certainty
X3 Innovation
X4 Region
X5 Educational Achievement
X6Urbanization

Equation: y=43

+xl022

3X3

4X4p5X5

--0.80
-1.34
-4.38
4.26
5.60
2.76

.438
.187
<.001
<.001
<.001
.009

6x6 +

and severity completely disappears. This shows that the relationship between
certainty and severity and murder rate is spurious: when the proper indicators of the
local social and political culture are introduced the relationship between severity
and homicide rate drops to insignificance.
These findings of spuriousness aside, there is a second major problem with the
studies of criminal sanctions and deterrence, which is theoretical in nature. As
discussed above, the theory of deterrence as applied to criminal behavior, or any
phenomenon for that matter (e.g., national defense), not only suggests, but requires
the combined presence of severe sanctions and high certainty (i.e., credibility) that
those sanctions will be applied. Previous analyses have treated this proposition
as an alternative rather than as a necessary condition as demanded by deterrence
theory. If in fact, deterrence was occurring, one would expect to find multiplicative
effects. As discussed above, neither Tittle nor Logan was able to find any such
effects. Are there interaction effects to be found? Does the theory of deterrence apply?
Gray and Martin tried to deal with this problem. They applied two models to
the Gibbs data. One included only additive effects, and one included only
multiplicative effects. Both of the models explained approximately the same share
of the variance, and consequently Gray and Martin concluded, for reasons of
8
parsimony, that the additive model was appropriate.'
25.

A more appropriate model would include both additive and multiplicative effects.
With the advent of the new contingency table techniques referred to above, this
can be done either with Gibbs' dichotomized data, or with the raw data using
linear regression. Table 5 shows the results of the contingency table analysis; the
TABLE 5
INTERACTION EFFECT
Murder Rate
Severity
low
low
high
high

Certainty
low
high
low
high

low
2
7
5
10

high
9
6
8
1

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
effect
Severity
Certainty
Interaction (Severity x Certainty)
Total (Severity, Certainty,
Severity x Certainty)

b
.14
.22
-. 04
-

df
1
1
1

5.63
13.30
0.49

3

28.32

X2

aEach of the variables included in this table has been dichotomized based upon the median for that
variable.

interaction term is not significant. The addition of an interaction term in the
regression model increases the R2 from .213 to only .225. Thus both the contingency
table analysis and the regression analysis show that there are no significant
interaction effects between severity, certainty and murder rate." Furthermore,
when an interaction term was added to the six variable model shown in Table 3, the
interaction again was not significant. The failure of this analysis to find the
multiplicative relationships suggested by a logically consistent application of
deterrence theory, even though simple additive effects can be found, suggests very
strongly that the apparent relationship between sanctions and crime rate may
be attributable to factors other than deterrence. And, indeed, the control variable
analysis reported above seems to confirm that such is the case.
Conclusions
This analysis has shown that when deterrence theory is rigorously applied to
the analysis of the general deterrent effect of criminal sanctions, and when proper
control variables are introduced, the apparent effect reported in previous papers
disappears. It should be reemphasized that this analysis, and the ones that preceded
it, have all dealt with marginal deterrence. There seems to be no viable evidence
that variations in crime rates can be directly attributed to variations in the severity
of sanctions; thus, the increasing of penalties for criminal conduct is likely to
have little effect on the incidence of that behavior. The larger question of whether
or not the threat of a penalty, any penalty (assuming that the potential penalty is
nontrivial), deters criminal behavior has not been (and perhaps cannot be) dealt
with. Criminal sanctions may deter, but the simple existence of the threat is
more important than the severity of the potential penalties.
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